译文（字数 8868）：

挪威石油化工业中的安全、保险和经济激励制度

Petter Osmundsen，Terje Aven，Jan Erik Vinnem

斯塔万格大学 产业经济学和风险管理部，挪威 斯塔万格

2005年3月1日收到，2006年3月16日收到修改稿，2006年11月13日接收2007年1月17日在线

摘   要

目前在石油行业中，关键绩效指标和激励机制越来越多地使用。根据现代激励理论，我们探索这种管理趋势对预防伤害、重大事故和安全生产有什么影响。经济激励制度可以用来预防事故？明显是不可能的。安全工作的挑战是什么？特别是安全工作在产品和收益率等经济诱因作用下会受到怎样的影响？安全可以被忽视吗？补救措施有哪些？

关键词：安全；经济激励；关键绩效指标

第一章  简介

重大事故造成的损失谁承担？重点从激励理论的角度来看。因为经济激励制度就是用来防止事故的发生。上帝是公平的，并且从狭义的经济学中可以看出能从经济激励中得到更多的补偿的公司能更好的预防事故。但其实公司更倾向于避免这类可能会有很高的损害赔偿的低频事件。他们通常采取两种方式：⑴努力降低事故风险；⑵购入保险。后者降低了破产的概率，但必须获得足够的资金。但我们应该注意的是保险抑制了经济激励效果，因为它减少了事故带来的经济补偿。我们需要寻求预防事故（伤害和事故预防）的经济激励制度和分散风险的保险合同的平衡点。石油行业只是作为一个典型案例。我们的目的是运用现代激励理论来解决安全问题。

外文原文（字符数 29843）：

Safety, economic incentives and insurance in the Norwegian petroleum industry

Petter Osmundsen, Terje Aven, Jan Erik Vinnem

Department of Industrial Economics and Risk Management, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway

Received 1 March 2005; received in revised form 16 March 2006; accepted 13 November 2006

Available online 17 January 2007

Abstract

There is an increased use of key performance indicators and incentive schemes in the petroleum industry. Applying modern incentive theory, we explore what implications this management trend has for injury and major accident prevention efforts and safety. Can economic incentives be designed for accident prevention activities? In cases where this is not possible, what are the challenges for the safety efforts? In particular, how are safety efforts affected by enhanced economic incentives for other performance dimensions like production and rate of return? Can safety be neglected? What remedies are available?

Keywords: Safety; Economic incentives; Key performance indicators

1. Introduction

Who bears the costs of a major accident? From the perspective of incentive theory this is a vital question, as it determines the economic incentives to prevent such accidents. All things equal, and in a narrow economic sense, the incentives for a company to prevent accidents are higher if higher fraction of the damages borne by the company. But companies generally prefer to avoid this type of low-frequency events that potentially may have high damages. They typically respond to this in two ways: (1) exerting efforts to reduce accident risk, and (2) taking out insurance. The latter is to reduce the probability of bankruptcy, and is often a requirement to obtain financing. It is worth noting, in our context, that insurance reverses the economic incentive effect, as it alleviates the economic consequences of accidents. We explore the trade-off between incentives for accident prevention (injury or major accident prevention) and the risk-spreading of insurance contracts. The oil industry is used as an illustrative case.